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Abstract 
Over the last few years, reorganization practice has undergone a 
massive change. A new device—the restructuring support agree-
ment—has transformed Chapter 11 negotiations. This puts reorganiza-
tion law at a crossroads. Chapter 11’s commitment to a nonmarket re-
structuring with a rigid priority system requires bankruptcy judges to 
police bargaining in bankruptcy, but the Bankruptcy Code gives them 
relatively little explicit guidance about how they should adjust when a 
new practice alters the bargaining environment. This essay shows that 
long-established principles of bankruptcy should lead judges to focus 
not on how these agreements affect what each party receives, but ra-
ther on how they can interfere with the flow of information needed to 
apply Chapter 11’s substantive rules. 
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 Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution 
 
Over the last few years, reorganization practice has undergone a mas-
sive change. Such tectonic shifts in large-firm Chapter 11 practice are, of 
course, nothing new. They take place every decade or two. A decade 
ago, going-concern sales changed the landscape; the decade before it was 
the exploitation of bankruptcy’s venue rules to shift major cases to Del-
aware.1 But each time there is such a change, it is necessary to take 
stock. The principal business of Chapter 11 is the bargaining over a plan 
of reorganization, and the structure of the bargaining environment dra-
matically affects who gets what. A new device—the restructuring sup-
port agreement—has transformed the plan-formation process. It lacks 
any basis in the Bankruptcy Code, and no statute allows it, one still 
needs to understand how bankruptcy judges should respond. 
In the past, the debtor initiated multiple rounds of negotiations in 
which everyone participated. Each party would push back against the 
claims of the other, and a consensus eventually emerged that left things 
roughly in equipoise. This has now changed. Instead of bargaining in 
which everyone participates, there is now a sequence of two-party bar-
gains, beginning with the key players (typically the senior creditor and 
the debtor). Each bargain fixes the share of the participating creditor. 
Changing the structure of bargaining in this fashion would not matter 
much if there were not much to bargain over. If the substantive rules 
allowed for little variation in what each party received or if the debtor 
had an incentive to limit what each creditor group received, changing the 
rules would not change outcomes. But neither is the case, at least not 
any more. Priority rights in bankruptcy are sufficiently uncertain that 
there are a broad range of confirmable plans in any case, each with radi-
cally different distributional consequences. And modern debtors are in-
terested in a speedy and successful exit from Chapter 11. They are rela-
 
1 For an empirical study of the rise of going-concern sales in large Chapter 
11 cases, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twi-
light, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673 (2003). For a critique of the migration of cases to 
Delaware, see Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 967-1003 (1999). 
 tively indifferent to how rights in the firm are divided. In crafting the 
plan, those controlling the debtor join forces first with those who can do 
most to help them exit bankruptcy quickly. They do not care how much 
of the reorganized firm they give away as long as the amount is still 
within the range of what a bankruptcy judge will approve.  
This essay tries to make sense of this state of affairs. Chapter 11 de-
pends on negotiations and bankruptcy judges need to police them, but 
the Bankruptcy Code gives them relatively little explicit guidance about 
how they should respond to changes in the bargaining environment. The 
emergence of a sequence of two-party bargains and the growing indif-
ference of directors to how assets are distributed have become manifest 
only in the last few years, and there is little wisdom about how the bank-
ruptcy judge should respond to these changes.  
Part I identifies the uncertainty that leads to bargaining in bankrupt-
cy. Chapter 11 vindicates priority rights through nonmarket valuations. 
The judge can do little more than find that any particular plan falls with-
in a broad range of what is reasonable. Any number of different bargains 
can be struck and still yield a plan that the bankruptcy judge will ap-
prove. Part II shows that courts typically have relied on the debtor and 
each of the creditors to push back against efforts to overreach. Policing 
the bargaining has been largely limited to ensuring that parties to the 
negotiations did not neutralize the debtor by making payoffs or “gifts.”  
The rest of this essay begins the job of asking whether and to what 
extent bankruptcy judges should do more in light of new conditions. 
Part III examines how things have changed. It reviews the basics of re-
structuring support agreements and identifies how the bargaining over 
the shape of the plan has become transformed into a series of two-party 
agreements between the debtor and other key players, beginning typical-
ly with the senior secured creditor group.  
Parts IV and V show that, even though bankruptcy judges have done 
relatively little policing of such negotiations, long-established principles 
suggest how bankruptcy judges should go about this task. Judges should 
focus not on how these agreements affect what each party receives, but 
rather on how they can interfere with the flow of information to the 
judge. Negotiations that lead to a confirmable plan should be problemat-
ic only to the extent they keep the judge in the dark. 
 I. Approximate Priority 
In theory, the Bankruptcy Code implements a regime of absolute pri-
ority.2 Senior creditors are allowed to recover what they are owed and no 
more. General creditors are entitled to be paid in full before equityhold-
ers receive anything.3 Strict adherence to absolute priority should protect 
those who are not parties to a restructuring support agreement. Parties 
should not able to use them to appropriate value to themselves, as those 
are adversely affected should be able to assert that their priority rights 
have been violated.   
Matters are not so simple, however. Chapter 11’s strict regime of ab-
solute priority takes as its benchmark the value the firm would have if it 
could be sold as a going-concern. When there is an actual sale, distrib-
uting the proceeds is relatively easy. Assume that the debtor’s only assets 
were ten one-dollar bills and payouts had to be in cash. If a senior credi-
tor were owed six dollars, there is not much to bargain about. The bank-
ruptcy judge will approve a plan only if it gives the senior creditor exact-
ly six dollars. But when there is a traditional reorganization we have 
what is, in effect, a hypothetical sale. A plan of reorganization depends 
crucially upon an imputed value of the firm. This estimate of value, like 
all estimates of value, is inherently noisy.4  
Bankruptcy judges are able to distill testimony from the experts and 
make unbiased valuations, but they can do little more than find that the 
valuations put forward in a plan fall within the range of what is reasona-
ble. It is not possible for them to do more. Valuations of firms can easily 
differ by ten or twenty percent among different experts, even when each 
is unbiased and hase no axe to grind.5 Among other difficulties, some-
 
2 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 Ann. 
Surv. Am. L. 9, 9 (1992) (“At the heart of corporate law is a fundamental or-
dering between the equity owners and the creditors: in the event of collapse, 
creditors will be paid in full before equity will receive any distribution from the 
company.”). 
3 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (plan must ensure that shareholders “not 
receive or retain under the plan on account of [their] interests any property”). 
4 Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 529, 533 (1986) (“All estimates of value are 
noisy.”). 
5 See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Richard S. Ruback, The Valuation of Cash 
Flow Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis, 50 J. Fin. 1059, 1076 (1995) (finding 
 one who values a firm must take account of idiosyncratic risk. The value 
of a firm may turn entirely on whether it will be able to navigate the reg-
ulatory hurdles that block its access to the licenses it needs to operate. 
Another firm’s fortune may turn on whether its new product line will 
find favor in the marketplace.  
Assessing such things requires judgment, and economic training pro-
vides little assistance. Even experts are not very good at making predic-
tions about events even just two or three years in the future,6 and as-
sessing the value of any firm depends on any number of such judg-
ments. In the face of this uncertainty, the exact value that the plan as-
cribes to the firm thus becomes a subject of negotiation. The bankruptcy 
judge can do little more than assess whether the valuations on which a 
plan is based are reasonable. For this reason, many plans with a range of 
values for the firm are confirmable. 
Moreover, the priority position of each creditor is often uncertain. 
This too creates room for bargaining. To be sure, recent reforms of 
nonbankruptcy law, particularly the overhaul of Article 9 at the begin-
ning of this century, have made the job of obtaining priority simpler, but 
it is by no means easy. Obtaining priority with respect to ordinary prop-
erty like equipment and accounts receivable is relatively straightforward. 
It typically requires only maintaining a simple filing with the secretary of 
state in the debtor’s place of incorporation. But it is possible to err even 
here. More than a billion dollars of J.P. Morgan’s priority position in the 
General Motors bankruptcy was rendered uncertain by a simple misstep 
with the filing system.7  
Elsewhere, matters are much more complicated. When a firm owns 
real estate, it must make a proper recording in the local records. Intellec-
tual property has particularly obscure rules. With respect to copyrights, 
 
that between 37 and 58 percent of valuations sampled showed errors of less 
than 15 percent). 
6 See Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How 
Can We Know? (2006) (empirical finding that experts as a group do no better 
than chance or simple algorithms with respect to predicting events three years 
hence). 
7 See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 777 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2015) (mistaken 
termination of financing statement nevertheless authorized and therefore effec-
tive). 
 for example, it is not even well-understood what needs to be done even 
in the simple case of unpublished work (which includes, among other 
things, any proprietary computer code that a firm owns).8 With respect 
to some types of collateral (such as broadcast licenses) it is not clear 
whether priority can be taken at all.9 The conventional wisdom is that 
there is some defect in a senior creditor’s collateral package in almost 
every case. There is a serious defect in perhaps twenty percent of cases. 
Priority may be uncertain for other reasons as well. In many cases, 
the senior priority position is asserted by a creditor who provided fi-
nancing for a leveraged transaction or that otherwise involved transfers 
of value from corporations to shareholders (or from subsidiary corpora-
tions to their parents). These priority positions are voidable to the extent 
that the transaction rendered the firm insolvent.10 Even when it does not 
seem likely that the firm was insolvent at the time of the transaction, the 
possibility that insolvency could be shown must be taken into account in 
negotiating the plan. A one-in-twenty chance of prevailing on the merits 
translates to a five percent discount on the senior creditor’s payout. With 
a billion-dollar line of credit, this translates to a $50 million pool of as-
sets for general creditors, who might otherwise have received nothing at 
all.11 
 
8 Compare In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 Bankr. 194 (C.D. Cal. 
1990) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation) (security interests in registered works 
must be filed with Copyright Office) with In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 
303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) (security interests in unregistered work need to 
be filed with Secretary of State of the state where the debtor is located). 
9 See, e.g., Sprint Nextel Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. (In re TerreStar 
Networks Inc.), 457 Bankr. 254, 262 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[A] lien cannot 
exist on the license itself.”). The fighting issue is whether proceeds that a li-
cense generates can be subject to a prepetition security interest. For a discus-
sion of this issue, see Kathryn Brooke Bates, Security Interests in the Airwaves: 
The Viability of Liens on FCC Licenses, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 903, 918 (2013).  
10 See, e.g., In re TOUSA, 680 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (guaranteeing a 
loan in order to forestall bankruptcy does not constitute reasonably equivalent 
value). 
11 For such a case, see Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007) (dispute 
between priority and ordinary general creditors over division of a $37.5 million 
settlement of an avoidance action against a senior lender owed $800 million). 
 Creditors are owed not simply the principal they lend, but, when their 
collateral is large enough to cover them, interest, fees, and reasonable 
costs such as professional fees as well.12 To recognize the priority posi-
tion of a secured creditor, all of these must be taken into account, as 
long as the total amount is less than the value of the collateral. The 
amount of principal is easy to determine, but much else is not.  
In recent years, for example, the liability of a debtor for “make-
whole” payments has been actively litigated. In the Energy Futures bank-
ruptcy, for example, a single creditor stood to gain $100 million if the 
make-whole clause was enforceable.13 In its reorganization, the restruc-
turing support agreement effected a partial settlement of the dispute of 
how much money it was owed, and the bankruptcy judge deferred to the 
debtor’s judgment in deciding whether to approve it.14  
The extent of any creditor’s priority position, like the value of the 
firm itself, is therefore somewhat uncertain. This is not to suggest that 
matters are hopelessly muddled, but in large cases some fraction of what 
creditors are owed is subject to negotiation and compromise. There are 
many plans that provide different distributions to the senior creditor 
that can be reasonably argued provide the senior creditor with what she 
is owed. 
Even if the value of the firm were fixed, priority positions clear, and 
amounts owed unambiguous, another source of uncertainty arises from 
the coin with which each creditor is paid. Even if one knows with cer-
tainty the discounted present value of a firm’s future cash flows, one 
cannot value a note the firm issues without estimating the volatility of 
this income stream. A note from a firm whose assets are treasury bills is 
worth more than an identical note from a firm whose assets consist sole-
ly of a lottery ticket with the same expected value. In a reorganization, 
each creditor’s old stake in the firm is exchanged for a stake in the reor-
 
12 11 U.S.C. §506(d). Oversecured creditors are entitled to costs and fees 
only if the loan agreement provides for them, but they almost always do. 
13 In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 533 Bankr. 106, 113 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2015) aff'd, 2016 WL 627343 (D. Del. 2016) (“Blue Mountain believes it would 
recover in the form of a make-whole payment should the automatic stay be 
lifted is slightly more than $100 million.”). 
14 See Delaware Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediat Holdings, LLC., 
527 Bankr. 157 (D. Del. 2015). 
 ganized firm whose value respects its entitlement under bankruptcy’s 
priority rules. The reorganization plan must assess the riskiness of each 
note that it issues and provide an interest rate that ensures it has the val-
ue that the Bankruptcy Code requires. This introduces another point of 
negotiation. The bankruptcy judge again cannot do more than assess 
whether the notes issued in a reorganization have roughly the value that 
the plan imputes to them.15 
In short, rather than a regime of absolute priority, it more reasonable 
to say that existing law puts in place a regime of approximate absolute 
priority. In practice, plans are confirmable as long as the values given 
each of the creditors fall within a reasonable range. The bankruptcy 
judge does not value the firm, determine priority positions, set the 
amount of claims, or fix interest rates. Instead, she decides whether the 
plan put before her meets the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code 
over each of these dimensions.  
The judge gives de facto deference to a plan and those objecting to it 
must cross a hurdle before they can defeat a plan. The bankruptcy judge 
confirms a plan unless a dissenting creditor or a dissenting class of credi-
tors can successfully lodge an objection. As a result, there are many 
plans that are confirmable, and each can have significantly different dis-
tributional consequences. The types of bargaining that are allowed in the 
plan confirmation process will determine exactly how much of a share 
each party receives.  
 II. Bargaining in the Shadow of a Judicial Valuation 
The judge’s inability to implement a legal rule with precision is not in 
the first instance troublesome, nor unique to bankruptcy. Legal deci-
sionmaking is not an exact science, and the inability of the judge and the 
jury to apply the substantive legal rule perfectly is not necessarily costly. 
As long as the relevant legal rule is applied in an unbiased fashion, the 
legal rule should give parties the right set of incentives.  
 
15 Some courts have found that, instead of trying to establish an interest 
rate, they are obliged to start with a base rate and add a risk premium. The 
amount of the risk premium, however, is itself contestable. See In re MPM 
Silicones, LLC, 2014 WL 4436335, at *25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) aff’d, 531 
Bankr. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 Parties are free to settle parts of a piece of litigation, stipulate to facts, 
limit discovery, set briefing timetables, and otherwise set the course of 
civil litigation.16 This might seem to introduce another distortion, but 
settlement in the shadow of an uncertain legal rule is not problematic 
either. The ability of each party to fall back on their rights ensures that 
the bargaining reflects the substantive legal standard in expectation, even 
if it cannot be measured with precision.  
Bankruptcy might seem cut from the same cloth. Just as in civil litiga-
tion, bargaining in Chapter 11 is done in the shadow of the law. The 
drafters of the Bankruptcy Code believed that these bargaining dynamics 
would lead to settlements that respected the priorities that the Bank-
ruptcy Code put in place. They were well aware of these inherent uncer-
tainties in implementing the absolute priority rule in a nonmarket envi-
ronment. But they believed that no group would be able to take ad-
vantage of the other and a bargain would emerge that would vindicate 
the priority scheme the Bankruptcy Code put in place. Each party in in-
terest would have an incentive to push its own position. The plan that 
emerged would be in the middle of the possible confirmable plans. The 
equipoise among various parties would ensure that distributions took on 
the pattern that the drafters wanted.17  
 
16 Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affirmatively encourage both the 
court and the parties to settle. See, e.g., F.R.C.P. §16(a)(5) (“In any action, the 
court may order the attorneys . . . to appear for one or more pretrial confer-
ences for such purposes as . . . facilitating settlement.”). 
17 Indeed, it is the change in this balance that has led both to advocate 
bankruptcy reform in recent years. See, e.g., Richard Levin & Kenneth Klee, 
Rethinking Chapter 11, International Insolvency Institute, Twelfth Annual In-
ternational Insolvency Conference (June 21–22, 2012), at p. 6, available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/337/5966.html (ar-
guing, in light of the changing dynamics of Chapter 11 for “rebalanc[ing the 
Code] to take account of the appropriate interests of each class of creditors in 
protecting their own positions while respecting the rights of other classes”). 
The idea of imputing intent to the drafters of legislation is decidedly un-
fashionable these days, but the drafting of the Bankruptcy Code itself was 
placed in the hands of two gifted young lawyers. Even without power over the 
substance of the Bankruptcy Code, they were witness to the various forces at 
work and can testify to what they were charged with doing, what they tried to 
do, and what political forces were at work. Hence, whatever its relevance, the 
intention of the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code is accessible. 
 In such an environment, the danger that loomed largest appeared to 
be that secured creditors might obtain a plan that suited them making 
“gifts” to those in control of the plan so that they would not push back. 
As long as outright bribes were forbidden, a balanced plan would 
emerge. 
The Bankruptcy Code itself does not have an explicit prohibition on 
gifting, but it exists implicitly in its requirement that a plan can be con-
firmed over the objection of a class of creditors only if it is “fair and eq-
uitable.”18 This word is a term of art that imports into the Bankruptcy 
Code the principles in a line of cases that included Boyd v. Northern Pacific 
Railroad.19 These included a prohibition on plans in which a shareholder 
received a payout and a dissenting class of claims of general creditors 
was not being paid anything.20  
The senior creditor is not free to divert value to the old equity even 
when she is not being paid in full. Substantively, of course, the “gift” 
from the senior creditor to the old equity is unproblematic. If the firm is 
not worth enough to pay the senior creditor in full, the firm belongs to 
her. She should be able to share what she receives with anyone she 
pleases. That the recipient turns out to be an old shareholder should not 
itself be of any moment. But we need to worry about the effect that the 
gift has on the integrity of the bankruptcy process.  
Asserting that the senior creditor is not paid in full assumes away the 
question that the plan confirmation process is designed to answer. When 
there is a nonmarket reorganization, the only way to tell whether the 
firm is worth less than what the senior lender is owed is through a judi-
 
18 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(1). 
19 See Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). Even though 
Boyd itself does not use the words “fair and equitable,” these terms have long 
been understood to embody its principles. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber 
Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939) (“The words ‘fair and equitable’ . . . are 
words of art which . . . acquired a fixed meaning through judicial interpreta-
tions in the field of equity receivership reorganizations. [T]he term ‘fair and 
equitable’ included, inter alia, the rules of law enunciated by this Court in the 
familiar case[ ] of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd.”). 
20 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the 
Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 738, 
744 (1988) (“The basic lesson of Boyd . . . is that leaping over an intermediate 
class triggers special scrutiny.”). 
 cial valuation or a set of negotiations done in the shadow of a judicial 
valuation. A prohibition on gifting ensures that these negotiations are 
not distorted. 
A recent case from the Second Circuit illustrates this understanding 
of the anti-gifting rule.21 ICO Global Communications founded DBSD 
in 2004 to develop a mobile communications network that would use 
both satellites and land-based transmission towers. In its first five years, 
DBSD made progress toward this goal, successfully launching a satellite 
and obtaining certain spectrum licenses from the FCC, but it also accu-
mulated a large amount of debt. Because its network had not become 
operational, DBSD had insufficient revenue to service its debt.  
The senior lenders negotiated a deal with ICO, in which they would 
receive new notes and the bulk of the equity in the reorganized firm, 
worth between half and three-quarters of the amount they were owed. 
Unsecured creditors would receive a small slice of the equity, and ICO 
itself would receive both shares and warrants. The senior lender and 
ICO filed for bankruptcy and sought to confirm this plan. One of the 
unsecured creditors objected. The Second Circuit held that this plan vio-
lated the rule of Boyd and refused to confirm it.22 
The shareholders in DBSD were not diverse public shareholders with 
no role in running the affairs of the company. Rather, they had formed a 
holding company that completely controlled the debtor. It is possible to 
characterize the “gift” in that case as the price that those controlling the 
debtor (and hence the reorganization process) could demand in advance 
of the filing for supporting the plan of reorganization. The shareholders 
had a fiduciary duty in exercising their control that ran to all the inves-
tors in the firm. They were not being paid for any future value or ser-
vices they might contribute to the business; on the contrary, they were 
being paid for putting in place a reorganization plan that one set of in-
vestors wanted to implement at the expense of others. 
Members of the board have a duty of loyalty. That the action in ques-
tion (a plan that otherwise comports with the absolute priority rule) is 
 
21 Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD, North America, Inc. (In re DBSD, North 
America, Inc.), 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2010). 
22 Id. at 100–01 (“although Congress did soften the absolute priority rule in 
some ways, it did not create any exception for ‘gifts’ like the one at issue 
here”). 
 sensible is not the point. Directors are supposed to make independent 
decisions and are not supposed to accept any payoffs in the course of 
doing the right thing. The anti-gifting rule is a prophylactic rule that nips 
such mischief in the bud. It aims at ensuring that the plan-formation 
process is squeaky clean. As the Second Circuit put it, “if the parties 
here were less scrupulous or the bankruptcy court less vigilant, a weak-
ened absolute priority rule could allow for serious mischief between sen-
ior creditors and existing shareholders.”23 The “anti-gifting” principle 
ensures that secured creditors are not able to buy off the old equity and 
advance a plan that promotes their interests at the expense of general 
creditors. In the course of bargaining with the debtor in advance of 
bankruptcy, creditors can negotiate with those who control the reorgani-
zation process, but they cannot bribe them. 
The anti-gifting principle is located in the provision of the Bankrupt-
cy Code governing the confirmation of plans.24 In this sense it appears 
to be too narrow. Consider a recent case from the Third Circuit. Jevic 
Transportation ceased operations without any advance notice to its 
workers and then filed a Chapter 11 petition.25 By the time the Chapter 
11 had run its course, the debtor had only $1.7 million left, all of which 
was subject to the lien of two secured creditors, one of which was the 
private equity investor. The creditors’ committee brought a fraudulent 
conveyance and preference action against the two secured creditors and 
survived a motion to dismiss.  
A round of settlement negotiations ensued, and an agreement was 
reached. One of the secured creditors put $2 million into a fund to pay 
the debtor’s and the committee’s fees and other administrative expenses. 
The remaining $1.7 million that was subject to liens was placed into a 
trust to pay tax and administrative claims and then general unsecured 
creditors. Finally, the case would be dismissed.  
Left out of the bargain were the WARN Act claims of the workers, 
claims they asserted against both the debtor and the private equity fund. 
Most of these were priority wage claims that would ordinarily prime the 
 
23 DBSD, 634 F.3d at 100. 
24 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(1). 
25 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business 
Credit, Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 claims of ordinary unsecured creditors. Because the funds were placed 
into the trust, the general creditors received funds that, had they been in 
the estate, would have gone to the truckers. 
It seems that the truckers were unable to settle the WARN Act claims 
because the private equity fund (which was also a secured creditor) was 
unwilling to join a settlement that put funds at the disposal of an illiquid 
party bent on litigation against it. As its counsel explained, “If the mon-
ey goes to the WARN plaintiffs, then you’re funding someone who is 
suing you who otherwise doesn’t have funds.”26 
The deal between the secured creditors and the creditors’ committee 
had the effect of skipping over a class of creditors, but by its terms, the 
“fair and equitable” requirement did not apply, as the deal was imple-
mented outside of a plan of reorganization. The bankruptcy judge was 
convinced that if he did not approve this deal, no one other than the 
secured creditors would receive anything. The most senior creditor’s lien 
might be vulnerable to a fraudulent conveyance attack in theory, but as a 
practical matter no one would bring it. As the bankruptcy judge ex-
plained, “any lawyer or firm that signed up for that role should have his 
head examined.” In approving the settlement, he was deciding on a 
course that left unsecured creditors with either “a meaningful return or 
zero.”  
The Third Circuit found that, even though the prohibition that the 
“fair and equitable” imposes on plan of reorganizations, did not explicit-
ly apply, the principle was at work nevertheless. A settlement that 
skipped over some creditors is “likely to be justified only rarely.” It nev-
ertheless affirmed, over a strong dissent, finding that the Code permits a 
structured dismissal when “the traditional routes out of Chapter 11 are 
unavailable and the settlement is the best feasible way of serving the in-
terests of the estate and its creditors.” By approving the structured dis-
missal, the bankruptcy judge made some creditors better off without 
making anyone else worse off.  
But the big issue in such cases may not be on the substantive distri-
bution in the case itself, but the way in which permitting such payments 
alters the bargaining environment in all cases. We need to worry that it 
gives parties an incentive to create situations in which accepting such a 
 
26 See 787 F.3d 173, 186 (3d Cir. 2015) (Sirica, J., dissenting). 
 bargain becomes the best option. The willingness of a judge to accept 
such bargains makes it more likely that parties will find ways to orches-
trate an environment in which it is the best option. The rationale for re-
fusing to enforce such agreements is the same as the rationale as outlaw-
ing the payment of ransom or putting in place a policy of never negotiat-
ing with terrorists. 
We always need to worry that mischief may be going on beneath the 
surface. Consider the following. Debtor owes Senior Lender $50 million. 
Uncontroverted expert testimony shows that Debtor is worth less than 
$50 million. Debtor has both institutional debt and trade debt; all of it is 
unsecured. The institutional debt, amounting to about half of the debt 
of Debtor, is held by five sophisticated and aggressive hedge funds 
based in the Southern District of New York. The trade debt, also 
amounting to about half the debt of Debtor, is dispersed among hun-
dreds of mom-and-pop suppliers. Some live in Peoria, but most are lo-
cated in smaller, more rural, towns.  
The trade creditors are not active in the case, but the hedge funds 
make noises about the validity of Senior Lender’s liens. These, however, 
become muted once plan negotiations start in earnest. Debtor puts for-
ward a plan, supported by Senior Lender and the hedge funds. Senior 
Lender receives all the equity of the reorganized debtor. All the unse-
cured creditors are paid 5 cents on the dollar. In a side deal, Senior 
Lender promises to give each of the hedge funds a 40-cents-per-dollar 
premium.     
In substance, the hedge funds have secured a settled an avoidance ac-
tion and captured the proceeds for themselves. When seen together with 
the side-payment, the plan violates Bankruptcy Code’s pro-rata sharing 
principle. One might argue that such a plan should not be confirmed 
even if the trade creditors were in a class by themselves and consented 
to the plan. Bankruptcy is designed so that the most active and vigilant 
creditors protect others at the same priority level. Side payments are ob-
jectionable even other rules are satisfied. When the hedge funds chal-
lenge the validity of the liens, all the general creditors should benefit. 
The Bankruptcy Code requires the judge to be satisfied that a plan 
must be proposed in good faith. This provision does not explicitly im-
port the idea of “fair and equitable” into the definition of good faith, but 
 it is possible—and indeed sensible—to take account of anti-gifting prin-
ciples in assessing the good faith of the plan proponent.  
Bush Industries illustrates.27 Bush’s core business was the manufacture 
of ready-to-assemble furniture. It expanded aggressively and then faced 
severe financial problems when the economy turned. As a group, the 
secured creditors entered into negotiations with the debtor. The debtor 
agreed to propose, and the secured creditors agreed to accept, a plan of 
reorganization in which the secured creditors would have their notes 
substantially scaled back and receive the equity in the reorganized corpo-
ration. All other creditors would be paid in full, but the interests of the 
old equityholders would be cancelled. The old equityholders objected to 
the plan. 
The court rejected the argument that the shareholders were in the 
money. It was satisfied that the value of the business was less than the 
$160 million owed the senior creditors.28 The senior lenders, however, 
promised to continue to pay the CEO of the company, even though 
there was no expectation that he would do any work. (Indeed, he had 
already left the company and moved to Florida.) The court was not ob-
jecting to the “golden parachute” per se. As the court explained, “So 
long as allowed claims exceed the value of a reorganized debtor, the 
class of pre-petition interest holders has no inherent right to object to an 
employment contract whose cost is effectively paid by new owners of 
the reorganized debtor.”29 But the golden parachute along with the re-
lease showed that the officers and directors had advanced their own in-
terests, not the interests of the shareholders.  
The CEO of Bush was also a shareholder, but nothing about the log-
ic of the opinion requires it. The fact of the agreement itself showed that 
the debtor did not put forward a plan in good faith. The objection was 
not to the golden parachute in its own right, but to the way in which 
they distorted the plan process. If the process is not fair to the nonpar-
ticipating investors, then the plan that arises from it cannot be con-
firmed, regardless of whether it has been modified along the way to 
comply with any substantive rules of the Bankruptcy Code.  
 
27 In re Bush Industries, Inc., 315 Bankr. 292 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004). 
28 See id. at 301–02. 
29 Bush, 315 Bankr. at 305. 
 Taking full account of the “anti-gifting” principle is an important part 
of applying the Bankruptcy Code faithfully. Consider, for example, 
whether it should apply when a senior creditor offers to reimburse ex-
penses of the creditors’ committee who are consenting to a sale of the 
assets. Other postpetition expenses enjoying the same priority are not 
being paid in full. Such payments fall outside the scope of the anti-
gifting doctrine as traditionally conceived. There is no plan that is con-
firmed and the assets do not properly belong to the estate.30 Neverthe-
less, the potential mischief such side-payments might cause seems the 
same. 
Broadening the scope of the anti-gifting rule in this fashion is entirely 
sensible, but one should not assume that a properly articulated anti-
gifting rule should demarcate the extent to which the bankruptcy judge 
polices the bankruptcy bargain. Bankruptcy judges enjoy broad equitable 
discretion to ensure the integrity of the process and each new develop-
ment in bankruptcy practice requires them to assess how that power 
should be used. Restructuring support agreements do not typically in-
volve gifts, but they have changed the bargaining dynamics significantly 
and therefore require recalibration of the bankruptcy judge’s responsibil-
ities. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to look first at restruc-
turing support agreements themselves and examine how they have 
evolved and how they have been used.  
III. Restructuring Support Agreements and Creditor Control 
In the late 1990s, senior lenders began to devise various ways to ex-
ercise control over the reorganization process. In particular, it became 
common for a senior creditor to gain control of the Chapter 11 process 
by exploiting the rules governing the debtor’s ability to obtain postpeti-
tion financing.31  
 
30 It was for this reason—that no property of the estate passed to the prepe-
tition creditor—that the Third Circuit refrained from holding the payment was 
suspect. See In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 555 (3d Cir. 2015) (“In 
this context, we cannot conclude here that when the secured lender group, us-
ing that group's own funds, made payments to unsecured creditors, the monies 
paid qualified as estate property.”). 
31 See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, The Creditor in Possession, 21 
No. 1 Bankr. Strategist 1, 4 (2003);  
 To prevent the debtor in possession from taking risks that jeopardize 
a senior creditor’s priority position, the Bankruptcy Code makes it hard 
for the debtor to borrow from anyone else.32 Few want to lend to a 
debtor in bankruptcy without taking collateral, and there are severe lim-
its on the ability to grant such priming liens over the objection of the 
senior lender. Hence, the senior lender will agree to finance the debtor 
only after the debtor agrees to many conditions. Senior creditors have 
become accustomed to conditioning postpetition financing of the debt-
or’s operations on quick going-concern sales or a fast-track towards con-
firmation.33 In short, the senior creditor is able to gain control through 
its ability to limit the debtor’s ability to obtain financing from anyone 
else and to place conditions on its own financing.  
Over the last decade, secured creditors have also discovered that they 
could increase their control over the debtor in a different fashion—
through the use of restructuring support agreements. Restructuring sup-
port agreements are a natural outgrowth out of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
affirmative commitment to prepackaged bankruptcies.34 Restructuring 
support agreements ensure that everyone can be confident that a pre-
packaged plan that parties shape outside of bankruptcy is implemented 
inside of bankruptcy. Creditors do not want to back a plan unless they 
know the debtor will back it as well. For its part, the debtor wants to be 
sure that the creditors will vote for the plan and place no hurdles in the 
way of its smooth adoption.35 An agreement among the parties to sup-
port a plan ensures that the course through bankruptcy is an easy one. 
When parties cannot agree on a plan, restructuring support agree-
ments provide a base camp.  Either before bankruptcy or during it, two 
or more parties can agree on a time table and the basic elements of a 
 
32 11 U.S.C. §364. 
33 Robin Phelan & Ocean Tama, The Use of DIP Financing As A Mecha-
nism To Control The Corporate Restructuring Process, 44 Tex J. Bus. L. 15 
(2011). 
34 This commitment is manifest from §1121(a), which permits a debtor to 
file a plan with its petition, §1125(g), which provides for the solicitation of 
votes before the petition, and §1126(b), which provides that these votes may be 
counted. 
35 Quite apart from seeking to change their vote, absent of any commitment 
to the contrary, they would be able to assert other rights, such as demanding 
adequate protection or objecting to the agreed-upon dip financing order. 
 plan. Even if the details need to be worked out and additional parties 
brought on board, it at least provides a point of departure. Restructuring 
support agreements provide conspicuous benefits. They provide a clear-
er, quicker, and more reliable path toward exit from Chapter 11.  
Restructuring support agreements, when entered into or modified af-
ter the start of the case, might not seem permissible under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, §1125 seems to limit 
the ability of parties to strike deals with each other. It prohibits “solicita-
tion or rejection of a plan” before the court has approved a disclosure 
statement.36 When a debtor in bankruptcy negotiates with a particular 
creditor and exacts its binding promise to support a particular restructur-
ing, it might seem that the debtor has “solicited” the “acceptance” of a 
plan of reorganization. But for restructuring support agreements even to 
be permissible, this cannot be so.  
The text of the Bankruptcy Code is hard to square with many fea-
tures of modern bankruptcy practice. The section governing disclosure 
is a conspicuous example. The section is a relic of the New Dealers’ 
concern that courts overseeing reorganizations needed to prevent insid-
ers from negotiating plans that benefitted themselves at the expense of 
innocent outsiders.37 Today’s players in large reorganizations are sophis-
ticated distressed debt investors and have little in common with those 
§1125 was intended to protect. Moreover, a broad reading of §1125 that 
resulted in a flat prohibition on restructuring support agreements would 
make it nearly impossible for consensual plans of reorganization to 
emerge. 
To be sure, it is possible for multiple parties, without any formal 
agreement, to sign up to be “co-proponents” of a plan. The process of 
reaching this point in their negotiations does not run afoul of §1125 be-
 
36 See §1125. 
37 See, e.g., Jerome N. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects 
of Corporate Reorganization, 19 Va. L. Rev. 541, 569 (1933) (“There is every 
reason why that court should approve and foster active supervision by the low-
er courts of reorganizations so as to protect the average security holder who is 
otherwise helpless. Courts of equity have a tradition of aiding the helpless, such 
as infants, idiots and drunkards. The average security holder in a corporate re-
organization is of like kind.”). Jerome Frank succeeded William O. Douglas as 
the chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 cause it stops short of a binding commitment to vote in a particular 
fashion.38 Parties to it can always withdraw. Similarly, one-on-one dis-
cussions between sophisticated stakeholders do not pose a problem ei-
ther, even if the communication is a draft plan. And obtaining informal, 
nonbinding assurances from a creditor to support a particular plan does 
not violate §1125 either. 
The informal understandings and assurances such as these, however, 
are often not enough in a world in which claims trade constantly. The 
holder of a particular claim may be a bank one day and a vulture investor 
the next. To push the plan process forward, it is useful to bind parties 
and theirs successors to ensure support garnered today persists.  
One path to circumnavigating §1125 is to couch a restructuring sup-
port agreement as a settlement. Even settlements include stipulations 
that oblige a creditor to support a particular plan do not run afoul of 
§1125.39 The typical restructuring support agreement, however, is hard 
to fit within this Procrustean bed. 
Nevertheless, most bankruptcy judges find that postpetition agree-
ments in which parties commit to support a particular plan are permissi-
ble and do not constitute improper solicitations under §1125.40 These 
courts point to clauses that give fiduciary outs to the parties, the exist-
ence of various termination events, and the fact that creditors cast their 
actual votes only after the disclosure statement is approved. Most im-
portantly, they read the section in light of its original purpose—to pro-
tect uninformed outside investors. Negotiations among sophisticated 
 
38 See, e.g., In re The Heritage Org., LLC, 376 Bankr. 783, 791 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2007) (“[I]f a creditor believes that it has sufficient information about the 
case and the available alternatives to jointly propose a Chapter 11 plan with 
another entity …, it is absurd to think that the signing of a term sheet by those 
parties … is an improper solicitation of votes in accordance with §1125(b).”). 
39 See, e.g., In re Texaco, Inc., 81 Bankr. 813 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding 
agreement not to support other future plans is not solicitation to reject current 
plan). 
40 See, e.g., Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank of N.Y., 860 F.2d 94, 101 
(3d Cir. 1988) (“We agree with the district court that ‘solicitation’ must be read 
narrowly.”); In re Kellogg Square Partnership, 160 Bankr. 336, 340 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1993) (“However, there is no significant reason not to apply Century 
Glove’s rationale to the debtor in reorganization, so as to limn [sic] the concept 
of ‘solicitation’ as coeval with the formal polling process.”). 
 insiders cannot be “solicitations” if reorganizations are to work in a 
fashion consistent with the overall structure of the Bankruptcy Code. As 
Judge Shannon explained in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC: 
[All the parties are] sophisticated financial players and have been 
represented by able and experienced professionals throughout 
these proceedings. It would grossly elevate form over substance to 
contend that §1125(b) requires designation of their votes because 
they should have been afforded the chance to review a court-
approved disclosure statement prior to making or supporting a 
deal with the Debtor.41 
But the benefits of restructuring support agreements come with 
costs. Most conspicuously, they enhance the powers of senior creditors. 
Senior creditors have learned to have exploit restructuring support 
agreements to gain an additional lever of control over the debtor. Sup-
port agreements have evolved well beyond a straightforward document 
that sets out the substance of the plan that the parties intend to put be-
fore the court. It sets out not simply the outline of a plan, but also the 
process for getting it confirmed.  
The typical support agreements now contain a number of milestones. 
The dip financing order and the disclosure statement must be approved 
by a specified date. Deadlines are similarly fixed for voting and plan con-
firmation. The plan support agreement fixes not only the particular sub-
stantive terms in a plan, but the bankruptcy process itself.  
Restructuring support agreements often work in conjunction with a 
debtor-in-possession financing agreement. Senior creditors often agree 
to provided debtor-in-possession financing or consent to cash collateral 
at the same time they enter into restructuring support agreements. There 
are often cross-default clauses, such that a failure to meet a milestone 
under the restructuring support agreement is a default under the dip. 
Similarly, a failure of the debtor to comply with the conditions of the 
 
41 486 Bankr. 286, 296 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013). Judge Shannon’s opinion in 
this case, as well as Judge Houser’s opinion in Heritage, have done much to allay 
the concerns that Judge Walrath raised on the bench in In re Stations Holding 
Co., Inc., No. 02-10882 (Bankr D. Del. Sept. 25, 2002); see In re NII Holdings, 
Inc., No. 02-11505 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 22, 2002), where she expressed doubt 
about the ability of parties to commit themselves to supporting a plan postpeti-
tion. 
 postpetition financing agreement is a default under the restructuring 
support agreement that entitles the senior creditor to walk away from 
the plan that was on the table.  
The powers that senior creditors enjoy are limited only by their own 
imagination and the willingness of the debtor to grant them. The debtor 
promises not to bring any avoidance actions against parties to the 
agreement.42 It promises to oppose the appointment of a trustee or an 
examiner with expanded powers.43 The appointment of an equity com-
mittee terminates the support agreement.44 The debtor promises to pro-
vide the consenting creditors access to information.  
Some restructuring support agreements can be even more aggressive. 
In Molycorp, for example, the support agreement initially put forward re-
quired the debtor to appoint a named individual as its chief restructuring 
officer and gave that individual broad powers over the reorganization 
and the operations of the firm.45 In Walter Energy the support agreement 
tried to prevent the debtor from assuming any executory contracts or 
leases without first obtaining the consent of the steering committee of 
the first-lien lenders, and consent was to be in the committee’s sole dis-
cretion. Similarly, it tried to prevent the debtor from seeking approval of 
any employee retention plan without the written consent of the steering 
committee, consent again being within its sole discretion.46  
It is important, however, to distinguish between a senior creditor’s ef-
forts to exert control over the debtor from her efforts to capture a larger 
share of the going concern for herself. When senior creditors use the 
restructuring support agreement to put the plan on a tight timetable or 
to insist that the debtor appoint a chief restructuring officer, their pur-
suit of their own self-interest may work to everyone’s advantage. The 
 
42 Magnetation at §4(b)(iii). 
43 Magnetation at §4(a)(iii). 
44 Hercules Offshore, Inc., Draft Disclosure Statement (Form 8-K), p. 26, 
Exhibit B Plan Term Sheet p. 16 (Time line appended to RSA) (July 13, 2015). 
45 The restructuring support agreement required the CRO to undertake a 
review of the business and present recommendations to the Board. It would be 
a default under the restructuring support agreement if the Board failed to ac-
cept the recommendations unless Board members found that doing so would 
violate their fiduciary duties. 
46 Walter Energy Restructuring Support Agreement §11(g) & (h) (2015). 
 chief restructuring officer can improve the internal operations of the 
firm and make its finances more transparent. This oversight benefits the 
senior creditor, but at the same time it yields benefits to the junior credi-
tors as well.  
The benefits that secured creditors enjoy from entering into restruc-
turing support agreements turn in the first instance on the willingness of 
the debtor to grant the conditions that it demands. The drafters of the 
Bankruptcy Code assumed that those negotiating on behalf of the debt-
or would push back against the efforts of the senior creditor to push 
through a plan.47 The board was put in place by the shareholders and 
their loyalties in the first instance might lie with them, at least if they 
were not bought off with gifts. Those managing the debtor also had 
long-term relations with suppliers and others who formed the bulk of 
the unsecured creditors. The outlook of those in charge of financially 
distressed firms has changed dramatically over the last several decades. 
Boards of directors think about their duties differently today from the 
way they did when the Bankruptcy Code was written. This change, 
which we explore in the next part, make restructuring support agree-
ments much more troublesome and render a simple prohibition on gifts 
inadequate to ensure that the plan that emerges maintains the balance 
among the players that the drafters originally envisioned.  
IV. Bargaining in the Shadow of Chapter 11 
Fifty years ago, directors of large corporations were relatively passive, 
and, when forced to act, they were inclined to look after the interests of 
the shareholders. By the early 1990s, however, that creditors became 
more independent and less somnolent.48 Delaware courts have made it 
 
47 See Douglas G. Baird, Chapter 11’s Expanding Universe, 87 Temple L. 
Rev. 975, 981-84 (2015) (summarizing empirical work of LoPucki and Whit-
ford). 
48 In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communication 
Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991), the court found that, at least when 
the firm was financially distressed, directors could take account of the interests 
of creditors as well as those of the shareholders. As later cases made plain, 
however, it is one thing to say that a shareholder cannot prevent directors from 
looking after the interests of creditors when the firm is insolvent and quite an-
other to say that a creditor can bring an action against the directors for failing 
 clear that it was quite wrong to think that board members were bound 
to favor equityholders to the exclusion of others. Their duties go to the 
firm as a whole, rather than to existing equityholders.49 
Board members of firms in Chapter 11 may hold equity stakes in the 
business, but these are not likely to be a large part of her own portfolio 
and they are not worth much when the firm is in financial distress. They 
are likely to be replaced no matter what the outcome. As a result, they 
care most about ensuring that the firm emerges successfully and quickly 
from Chapter 11. What happens to the old shareholders or any other 
constituent is an afterthought. The day has long passed when sharehold-
ers of large firms in Chapter 11 expect to receive anything. Those with 
holding stakes at the time of the reorganization are in any event profes-
sionals who specialize in distressed debt. Those in control of the Chap-
ter 11 debtor have no particular sympathy for them. What they care 
about are their reputations. What keeps them up at night is the reputa-
tional hit they will take if the firm blows up on their watch. They will be 
judged by whether the firm reorganizes successfully, not how ownership 
interests in the firm are divided among the stakeholders.  
When a senior creditor presses for a restructuring support agreement 
that gives it control rights and other provisions that capture a compara-
tively larger share of the reorganization pie, those representing the debt-
or are not inclined to push back and ensure other constituents receive 
more. Instead, they are focused on whether the restructuring support 
agreement, regardless of how it divides the spoils, is likely to put the 
debtor on a course to a confirmed plan. 
Each successive restructuring support agreement affects the dynam-
ics of the bargaining over the one that is negotiated next. Those who 
come first are the ones—typically the senior creditors—who can do the 
most to ensure the firm reorganizes successfully. They tend to do better 
than those who come later. Creditors who do not join such agreements 
are, in principle, entitled to insist on their substantive rights at the end of 
the day, but they may find that they are left with relatively little. Because 
 
to look after their interests. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming 
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007). 
49 See Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3e 155 (Del. Ch. 
2014). 
 their priority rights cannot be defined with precision, it is easy for those 
in control to leave them short-changed.  
Debtors today have little incentive to push back and make sure those 
senior take as little as possible and no more than their share. Members 
of the board and the professionals they retain are more than happy to 
enter into a restructuring support agreement with senior creditors that 
puts the firm on a path to a successful reorganization. The restructuring 
support agreement provides the runway needed for a smooth landing. If 
the price is a somewhat larger share of the reorganized business, it is a 
price they are happy to pay. 
The new dynamic in Chapter 11 recalls Louisiana Governor Huey 
Long’s appeal to prospective backers: “Those of you who come in with 
me now will receive a big piece of the pie. Those of you who delay, and 
commit yourselves later, will receive a smaller piece of pie. Those of you 
who don’t come in at all will receive—Good Government!”50 From the 
perspective of those who are not part of the restructuring support 
agreement, the theoretical ability to vindicate their substantive rights at 
confirmation is equivalent of being entitled to “good government.”  
Restructuring support agreements allow the debtor to give larger 
shares to the creditors capable of causing the most trouble. The restruc-
turing support agreement enhances the debtor’s ability to shape the re-
organization and coral the various creditor groups. As long as the firm 
reorganizes successfully, everything else is a detail. 
Restructuring support agreements can themselves involve gifts and 
be problematic on that account. A restructuring support agreement in 
Caesar’s was put forward that went into effect only if those holding more 
than fifty percent of the debt signed it. The agreement rewarded credi-
tors who joined it with a “forbearance fee,” paid at the time the agree-
ment became effective. This fee was funded by its nondebtor parent.51  
 
50 For one of many accounts of this episode in Long’s life, see Christopher 
Hitchens, No One Left to Lie To: The Triangulations of William Jefferson 
Clinton 17 (2000). 
51 See Caesars Entertainment Corp., Form 8-K, filed on July 21, 2015, at 
Item 1.01 (parent has invited second-lien holders to enter a restructuring sup-
port agreement that requires them to instruct their indenture trustee to stay 
litigation in return for a pro rata share of $200 million).  
 A critical provision of the restructuring support agreement called for 
those joining it to instruct their indenture trustee to forbear from pursu-
ing separate actions against the parent. Because the agent was obliged to 
follow instructions by a majority, the deal, if it went into effect, would 
bind all the creditors. Such a deal might not have been possible outside 
of bankruptcy because of the Trust Indenture Act. Nor could it be im-
plemented in a Chapter 11 plan readily, as those in the class who con-
sented received something (the forbearance fee) that those who refused 
to join the agreement did not.  
Those declining to join this restructuring support agreement immedi-
ately dismissed it as “coercive” and its forbearance fee “improper.”52 
They also asserted that the noteholders joining it held equity in the par-
ent as well. From their perspective, the forbearance fee was a gift that 
distorted behavior even if it was not the ordinary gift that is given in re-
turn for supporting a plan.  
However such comparatively unusual gifts are treated in the context 
of restructuring support agreements, the most important challenge for 
the bankruptcy judge is discovering how to police such agreements 
when there is no “gift” and, if she is, how she should go about exercis-
ing this power.  
The question of what bargains a senior creditor and the debtor can 
strike in the their efforts to reorganize a firm first reached the Supreme 
Court in 1868 in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Howard.53 
When the Chicago Rock Island was hopelessly insolvent and, by all ac-
counts, not worth enough to pay its senior creditors in full, its senior 
creditors attempted to foreclose on the assets. The shareholders, rather 
than resisting, agreed to facilitate the sale of the railroad to a new entity, 
provided they were given a small stake in the new entity. After the assets 
were transferred to the new entity, the junior creditors appeared and 
demanded that the securities promised the shareholders be turned over 
to them instead. The Supreme Court found in their favor. 
 
52 See Statement from Official Committee of Second Priority Noteholders 
of Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, Inc., July 21, 2015, available at 
http://www.kccllc.net/CEOCNC. 
53 74 U.S. 392 (1868). 
 The Supreme Court found that the transaction in Howard could not 
extinguish the rights of the general creditors. Regardless of form, a 
transfer, however indirect, that diverts assets from an insolvent corpora-
tion and puts them in the hands of the shareholders cannot cut off the 
rights of creditors. The general creditors are entitled to reach the assets 
just as if they were still in the hands of the corporation.  
It has been long recognized that Howard’s reasoning is a specific man-
ifestation of familiar fraudulent conveyance principles.54 But fraudulent 
conveyance doctrine seems to fall short of explaining why this transac-
tion is suspect. The apparent vice—the sweetheart deal between the sen-
ior creditor and the shareholder—is objectionable on fraudulent con-
veyance grounds only if there is illegitimate transfer of value from the cor-
poration to the shareholder. It does not have any traction when the senior 
creditor uses its own money to buy cooperation from the old sharehold-
ers. There has to be a transfer from the firm to a shareholder. On its 
face, a transfer from a senior creditor to the shareholders falls outside its 
reach.  
The ability to reach assets from the shareholders depends crucially on 
being able to characterize the transaction as a transfer of corporate assets. 
One could equally characterize the transaction as one in which a senior 
creditor gave her own assets to the shareholder. Once the senior creditor 
forecloses on an asset that is not worth enough to pay it in full, the asset 
belongs to her. She is entirely free to give it to anyone she wants. Fraud-
ulent conveyance law reaches only transfers of the debtor’s assets. To ap-
ply it in this context, one has to explain why characterizing it as a trans-
fer of the corporation’s assets rather than the creditor’s makes sense. 
In the wake of Howard, the view took hold that, in the typical equity 
receivership, the ownership interest that old shareholders received in the 
reorganized railroad could not be characterized as a transfer of the cor-
poration’s assets. The protective committee acquired the railroad at a 
foreclosure sale using the bonds of the senior stakeholders. Junior credi-
tors could not complain about how the committee then chose to divide 
these interests. The senior creditors were free to strike any deal they 
wanted with the old shareholders. As long as the deal was at arms’ 
length, it was unobjectionable. The vice of Howard was that there was a 
 
54 Frank, supra note 37, at 541-42. 
 pre-existing deal in place between the senior creditor and the sharehold-
er to divert value. This was different from an equity receivership in 
which there was a receivership followed by arms’ length bargaining 
among the interested parties. 
J.P. Morgan represented the interests of the bondholders and over-
saw the restructuring of the Northern Pacific. As was typical for railroads 
of this era, his plan called for the senior bondholders to acquire the rail-
road free and clear. (Again, given their right to all the proceeds at the 
foreclosure sale, they could bid up to the amount of their bonds without 
being out of pocket.) As part of the restructuring, Morgan gave the 
shareholders the right to acquire interests in the equity of the reor-
ganized railroad if in return they contributed new capital.55 Old general 
creditors who were frozen out objected to this transaction and invoked 
Howard.  
The lawyers representing J.P. Morgan (partners at the predecessors to 
the Cravath and Davis Polk firms respectively) successfully rebuffed this 
argument. J.P. Morgan was entitled to reorganize the railroad and dis-
tribute new securities in it as he saw fit. What mattered was that the 
committee representing the senior creditors was the high bidder at the 
foreclosure and that there was nothing underhanded or suspect with the 
arms’ length bargains struck with the other stakeholders. To be sure, in 
the case of the Northern Pacific receivership, J.P. Morgan did not share 
any of the value of the railroad with the unsecured creditors, and he did 
share some of the value with the old shareholders, but this was his 
choice.  
During this era, investment bankers were constrained by their need 
to return to the same investors again.56 Investors would give them their 
capital for new projects only if they reorganized troubled railroads suc-
 
55 The capital the old equityholders contributed turned out to be less than 
the amount at which the new equity traded, but this was a detail. This was not 
the expectation of the shareholders before the fact. In other cases (such as the 
reorganization of the AT&SF), the stock had value significantly in excess of the 
cash they needed to contribute. 
56 Carlos D. Ramirez, Did J. P. Morgan’s Men Add Liquidity? Corporate 
Investment, Cash Flow, and Financial Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth 
Century, 50 J. Fin. 661, 664 (1995) (finding that Morgan's participation likely 
lowered the cost of capital). 
 cessfully and distributed the new stakes equitably and fairly. A court was 
not obliged to do more than ensure that there was nothing underhand-
ed. Bargains between investment bankers and various stakeholder con-
stituencies were self-enforcing. If they violated the expectations of in-
vestors when they parceled out securities in reorganized firms, they 
would pay the price. 
The purpose of the equity receivership was to allow people like J.P. 
Morgan to strike deals. It was his task, not the court’s, to come up with a 
plan of reorganization. As long as there was not a deliberate attempt to 
undermine the rights of the unsecured creditors, the general creditors 
could not object to the agreements between stakeholders. For the court 
in Paton v. Northern Pacific Railroad, there was nothing objectionable “un-
less it can be said that it was a scheme to defraud creditors.” As the 
court explained, 
it is suggested by [the junior creditors] that, upon any plan of re-
organization, the parties in interest are not to be at liberty to con-
tract with each other; but that the plan of reorganization should 
be formulated and imposed upon the parties by a court of equity. 
Courts are created for the purpose of enforcing contracts which 
parties have made, not for the purpose of making contracts for 
parties. It would be more than doubtful, if power was conferred 
upon a court to make a contract for parties, whether it could make 
as fair and just and equitable a contract as could the parties them-
selves.57 
This opinion invokes the idea of a restructuring being “fair and just and 
equitable.” It is one of the early harbingers of what became the “fair and 
equitable” test in §1129(b)(1) of modern Chapter 11. Significantly, the 
court in Paton does not look at the terms of the reorganization nor at 
whether assets are transferred from the old firm to the shareholders, but 
at the negotiations between the players.  
Under this view, the protection for the general creditors in a reorgan-
ization lies in the judicial supervision of the bargaining process. If the 
shareholders were willing to strike a deal and put in new cash and the 
senior creditor was willing to enter it, the court had no ability to inter-
vene, as long as there is nothing underhanded about the way the bargain 
 
57 Paton v. N. Pac. R. Co., 85 F. 838, 843 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1896). 
 is struck. Among other things, the court is simply not competent to in-
sist on details of the plan of reorganization. There was no virtue in shift-
ing assets among different investors in a railroad and there was the pos-
sibility of doing serious harm. 
When the Supreme Court confronted this same question the next 
year, it again focused on the standard of review that had to be brought 
to the negotiations between the parties that crafted the reorganization 
plan. The Court required the court to examine reorganization bargains 
more closely than the court in Paton had suggested. In its view, a court 
could “never rightfully become the mere silent registrar of the agree-
ments.” Courts had to draw a distinction between the right of the senior 
bondholder “who has acquired absolute title by foreclosure to mort-
gaged property to thereafter give of his interest to others,” and an illegit-
imate attempt on the part of the senior bondholders “to destroy the in-
terest of all unsecured creditors, to secure a waiver of all objections on 
the part of the stockholder, and consummate speedily the foreclosure.”58 
The Court, however, did not offer much guidance about how this line 
was to be drawn, but its focus was again on the way the bargain is struck 
and not on whether equity ends up holding a stake in the reorganized 
firm. 
Monon did imply that the court was to give greater scrutiny than the 
court in Paton suggested, but this part of the opinion was largely ignored 
in corporate reorganization practice. The Supreme Court visited this is-
sue again a decade and a half later. It was reviewing the same reorganiza-
tion of the Northern Pacific Railroad that was reviewed by the circuit 
court in Paton. It involved a different creditor (Boyd), one who needed 
almost two decades of litigation to establish his right of payment. Not-
withstanding the passage of time, Boyd retained his right to challenge 
the plan once he had proved his claim. This case became the canonical 
case that embodies the “fair and equitable” principle.59  
 
58 Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway, 
174 U.S. 674, 688, 19 S. Ct. 827, 832, 43 L. Ed. 1130 (1899). The rail-
road was known as the Monon, and among reorganization lawyers it was 
commonly referred to as the “Monon case.” 
59 Boyd did not actually use the word “fair and equitable,” but the Supreme 
Court long ago concluded that these words embodied the principles it em-
 Boyd has been a focal point for bankruptcy scholarship ever since it 
was decided. Boyd is commonly understood to prohibit “gifting,” at least 
when it distorts the incentives of those who are party to the plan negoti-
ations. But the Court did more than protect the substantive right of gen-
eral creditors to receive distributions before shareholders. The Court 
insisted that process mattered. The lawyers representing the railroad (the 
same partner from the precursor to Davis Polk who defended the reor-
ganization plan in Paton) urged that the general creditor had not been 
harmed by the reorganization, as the assets were insufficient to pay the 
senior creditors in full. Hence, any value that passed from the senior 
creditor to the shareholder was properly its own money and not the 
debtor’s The Court rejected this argument by pointing to the way that 
the payment affected the plan-making process. It was not enough to as-
sert that there was not enough to pay the secured creditors in full be-
cause this “assumes the very fact which the law contemplated was to be 
tested by adversary proceeding.” The shareholders were not required to 
contest this question (and in the process “necessarily have protected un-
secured creditors,” but the shareholders join forces with the creditors.  
Boyd does more than merely follow Howard. It does not focus simply 
on plans in which assets of the estate skipped over junior creditors and 
end up in the hands of the shareholders. The shareholders entered into 
an agreement in which they bound themselves not to push back against 
the senior creditors. This was the defect that required the court to inter-
vene and strike down the plan. 
Boyd holds that, in negotiating, the shareholders could not enter into a 
side deal that had the effect of compromising the rights of the general 
creditors. Boyd would have nothing to complain about if the stockhold-
ers simply walked away and did not challenge the foreclosure. But as 
soon as the shareholders struck a deal with the creditors, they lost the 
ability to ignore the general creditors. It was enough that they were par-
ties to a deal that froze out the general creditors. There is nothing in the 
logic of Boyd that limits its reach to transfers of property of the debtor. It 
does not matter whether the shareholders receive consideration from 
the debtor as opposed to the senior lender or whether they received any-
 
braced, see Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products, 308 U.S. 106 (1939), and 
Congress took account of this practice when it incorporated the “fair and equi-
table” principle into the Bankruptcy Code. See note 19. 
 thing at all. The mere fact of a deal was enough to make it objectionable. 
To be “fair and equitable” within the meaning of §1129(b), the plan con-
firmation process itself must pass muster. Those in control of the reor-
ganization could not strike a deal that froze some people out of the pro-
cess. 
Before Boyd, there was very little regulation of the contracting that 
was permitted in the reorganization. But this decision changed the way 
bargaining could be conducted, in addition to enhancing the substantive 
rights of creditors. Some types of bargains were ruled out of bounds. 
This case rejects the conclusion the court reached in Paton that it is not 
the judge’s job to police contracting in the plan-formation process, short 
of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.  
The Court in Boyd, however, did not spell out exactly what sort of po-
licing was appropriate. Until the relatively recent rise of restructuring 
support agreements and the change in the incentives of those represent-
ing the debtor in plan negotiations, the focus on what the phrase “fair 
and equitable” required was limited to gifts. Transfers of value should 
always trigger scrutiny of deals between the senior creditor and the 
debtor, but courts are empowered to police the plan process itself. Some 
types of bargains, even when there is no transfer of value to the debtor, 
are not “fair and equitable” and not filed in good faith. The principles of 
these cases are firmly embedded in the Bankruptcy Code. What is less 
clear, however, is the extent of the policing appropriate when no gift is 
involved. 
V. Policing the Bargain 
Bankruptcy judges regularly insist that part of their job is to ensure 
the integrity of the plan-formation process. In Innkeepers, a case involving 
a restructuring support agreement, the bankruptcy judge refused to per-
mit the debtor to assume the restructuring support agreement for a rea-
son that went beyond undue haste and capturing of additional assets to 
which the secured creditor was not entitled. The court found that the 
other creditors deserved “more of a process than what has been provid-
ed so far.” The agreement instead had the support of only one creditor 
“among the critical mass of creditors needed to support a successful re-
 structuring.”60 As the court explained, “[A] debtor’s exclusive period was 
intended by Congress to provide for an opportunity for the debtor to 
negotiate with its constituents and reach a consensual plan.”61 Quite 
apart from the substance of the agreement, it created a process that was 
itself suspect.  
But it is a mistake to suggest that bargaining is desirable for its own 
sake. Bargaining by itself in inherently wasteful. There is no reason to do 
it unless it serves some purpose. If the bargaining is done in pursuit of a 
plan of reorganization, it seems desirable. What about such bargaining 
should be suspect? The most obvious consequence of using restructur-
ing support agreements is that they leave creditors with the greatest abil-
ity to put the reorganization off course with more and creditors who 
lack such power with relatively less. But this alone may not be cause for 
concern.  
Even after deals are struck, the plan still has to be confirmable. The 
distortions of the distributions cannot be so great as to fall outside a cer-
tain range. The bankruptcy judge still has to find that it is consistent 
with the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the 
potential distortions need to be offset by the benefits that restructuring 
support agreements bring with them. The enhanced ability to form coa-
litions may offset to some extent the ability of individual creditor groups 
to extract value. If a restructuring support agreement between a senior 
creditor and a shareholder allows them to put in place a plan of reorgan-
ization that provides little or may payout to an out-of-the-money general 
creditor, the “distortion” that the restructuring support agreement 
brings may be closer to absolute priority than one where the general 
creditor could take advantage of the lack of a united front. 
But it is not obvious that even a two-party bargain that allows senior 
creditors to be overcompensated at the expense of the junior creditors 
should trouble us greatly. The ability to reorganize a firm more quickly 
and more cheaply has direct efficiency benefits. On the other hand, 
overcompensating senior lenders in a way that is out of step with their 
nonbankruptcy entitlements has in the first instance only ex post distri-
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 butional effects. Some creditors will receive more and others less, but 
sophisticated creditors should be able to account for such effects and 
ensure that they still enjoy the market return on their capital.  
To be sure, there may be indirect efficiency losses. Departing from 
nonbankruptcy priorities may make capital more costly and harder to 
obtain. But showing that these losses are large enough to care about 
turns out to be quite difficult. It is not even obvious that absolute priori-
ty itself—an invention of a Yale law professor in the 1930s—is efficien-
cy-enhancing. Even if it is, as long as one is committed to a nonmarket 
sale, the relevant question is not how much loss these distortions relative 
to a perfectly implemented absolute priority rule, but how costly they are 
relative to the imperfect approximate priority regime that courts will im-
plement when a debtor attempts to fashion plans without using restruc-
turing support agreements. 
But if the distributions themselves are not problematic, what exactly 
should a bankruptcy judge police? The sensible place to start is with the 
idea that the judge must have sufficient information to apply the con-
firmation rules to the case that is before her. When the restructuring 
support agreement limits the information coming from the debtor, in-
formation must come to the judge from somewhere.  
Boyd’s legacy is about ensuring the integrity of the process, beyond 
the distributional rules. This is best done not by trying to determine how 
much value is leaking or how large each creditor’s share would be in a 
different bargaining environment, but rather by trying to ensure that the 
negotiations are done in a way that ensures enough information flows to 
the judge so that she can apply the Code’s substantive rules. The way to 
incorporate Boyd then is not to worry about where money ended up or 
whether money passed hands, but process. If the debtor is not there to 
press for a different valuation or point to a deficiency in the senior 
creditor’s lien, someone else needs to be there. A plan is not “fair and 
equitable” if it keeps the bankruptcy judge in the dark—even if the sub-
stantive terms of the plan itself are unobjectionable. 
In ordinary two-party litigation, suppression of information by liti-
gants is rarely a problem. A judge can reach the optimal outcome be-
cause there are liberal discovery rules and each litigant has an incentive 
to reveal what the other hides. The situation is more complicated when 
there are multiple parties and only some of them have access to the rele-
 vant information. Often relevant information, such as information that 
goes the value of the firm, is not readily discoverable and individual 
creditors may lack the incentive to ferret it out. A restructuring support 
agreement may have the effect of silencing the person most likely to dis-
close the relevant information and indeed may have been entered into 
just for this purpose.  
A case now before the Third Circuit in Energy Futures puts the per-
missible reach of restructuring support agreements into play. Energy Fu-
tures was one of the largest Chapter 11s ever. It was the largest provider 
of power in Texas. It was organized into two principal businesses, one 
regulated and the other unregulated. Among the creditors were holders 
of first-lien notes that gave them rights, indirectly, in the regulated utili-
ty. The notes came in two flavors: $3.5 billion were 10 percent notes due 
in 2020 and approximately $500 million were 6⅞ notes due in 2017. 
Apart from the difference in the interest rates and maturity date, the 
notes were identical, with rights to the same collateral and the same lan-
guage in the make-whole clause. If the make-whole provisions were en-
forceable (and it was not clear if they were), the 10 percent notes would 
receive a payout of $1.19 for each dollar of principal and 6⅞ percent 
notes $1.08.  
The debtor and a group of creditors that consisted mostly of 6⅞ per-
cent noteholders entered into an elaborate restructuring support agree-
ment, including a term that provided that, immediately after filing, the 
debtor would make a tender offer to all first-lien holders. For each dollar 
of principal, the noteholder would receive $1.05 in postpetition notes. 
Nearly all (97 percent) of the 6⅞ percent noteholders accepted the ten-
der offer, but only 34 percent of the 10 percent noteholders accepted, 
and nearly all of these also held 6⅞ percent notes.  
On the face of it, this tender offer did not freeze out any who chose 
not to participate. The creditors who did not accept the tender offer had 
exactly the same substantive rights after the tender offer as before. If the 
nonassenting 10 percent noteholders wanted to argue that they were en-
titled to make-whole payments, nothing in the restructuring support 
agreement prevented it. They might end up with less if they litigated and 
lost, but in this respect they were no different than any other creditor 
who is given an offer to settle a claim and chooses to turn it down.  
 That the settlement took the form of a tender offer has no effect on 
the substantive rights of the parties. Each creditor had a chance to ac-
cept a settlement or take her chances. The debtor could force them to 
take something less than full payment only by cramming down a plan. 
Indeed, in one sense the support agreement left nonassenting creditors 
better off. Because those who settled with the debtor were out of the 
picture, they would find it easier to gather the votes to reject the plan 
and force a full-scale hearing in which the judge would have to value 
both the firm and the value of the securities they received. 
But it is easy to come up with a set of facts in which such a tender of-
fer is problematic. Assume the same facts except that the 6⅞ percent 
notes are concentrated in the hands of a few extremely sophisticated and 
litigious hedge funds. The rest are widely dispersed among relatively re-
mote and unsophisticated investors. The debtor enters into a restructur-
ing support agreement with the hedge funds. Immediately after filing the 
bankruptcy petition, the debtor makes a tender offer for all of the first-
lien notes. The hedge funds accept, and comparatively few of the unso-
phisticated investors do.  
It might seem that the unsophisticated investors have only them-
selves to blame. They could have taken the tender offer. But the outside 
investors operated in a vacuum, and this allows for advantage-taking. 
They were forced to decide whether to tender before there was a disclo-
sure statement. Indeed, in the case of Energy Futures, the noteholders had 
to make their decision before the debtor even filed its schedules.  
Under these assumptions, the question whether the make-whole 
clause was enforceable will not be pursued aggressively. If the debtor 
had been unable to make this offer, the hedge funds would have re-
mained in the case and aggressively pushed the enforceability of the 
make-whole provision. The comparatively unorganized and unsophisti-
cated outsiders would have been able to free-ride on these efforts.  
Most important, the plan itself would face judicial scrutiny. The judge 
has an independent obligation to ensure that the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code are satisfied before confirming a plan. She might decide 
that, by providing the same amount for each dollar of principal to the 
two types of noteholders, the outsiders holding the 10 percent notes 
were effectively receiving different treatment. Section 1123(a)(4) requires 
everyone in the same class receive the “same treatment.” Creditors may 
 not receive the same treatment if someone owed $1.19 for each dollar of 
principal is paid the same amount as someone owed $1.08 for each dol-
lar of principal.  
In policing negotiations, the bankruptcy judge needs to ensure that 
sophisticated noteholders cannot enter into side deals that leave the less 
sophisticated worse off. It is not enough that unsophisticated creditors 
have the theoretical right to complain. The Trust Indenture Act limits 
the ability of sophisticated creditors to cut deals with the debtor outside 
of bankruptcy. By design, the Bankruptcy Code ensures that any deals 
cut in bankruptcy are subject to judicial oversight that gives meaningful 
protection to outsiders.62  
Innocent outsiders would likely not contest a plan that gave nonten-
dering claimholders nothing for their make-whole claim. Even if they 
did, they might well find themselves overmatched in any litigation. That 
they were still receiving their substantive entitlement under the letter of 
the Bankruptcy Code does not cure the problem. Reorganization law 
protects all the creditors holding claims in a particular class by requiring 
that negotiations are themselves done in a prescribed way and subject to 
prescribed scrutiny. 
Ultimately, one needs to decide how to handle restructuring support 
agreements without explicit guidance from the Bankruptcy Code. One 
can turn to history and find a lesson there, but one can also argue that 
modern Chapter 11 should take account of the current environment. 
Those who chose not to tender in Energy Futures were not exactly the 
innocent outsiders that Chandler Act was meant to protect. The typical 
large reorganization today affects only the rights of sophisticated inves-
tors. Whether junior or senior in the capital structure, the players will be 
a hedge fund, a large pension fund, an insurance company, or a bank. 
 
62 Under the equity receivership, protective committees would form and 
amass enough of the senior securities to credit bid at the receiver’s sale of the 
assets. (Instead of dollar-for-dollar, they were able to credit bid only for the 
proportion of the senior tranche they controlled and provide cash for the bal-
ance.) Because of their ability to credit-bid, no other serious bids would appear. 
The outsiders who did not tender their claims to the protection committees 
had only the right to their pro rata share of the artificially low credit-bid. 
Courts insisted that the protection committees bid a minimum amount. (They 
established an upset price.) But those who backed the Chandler Act found this 
was not enough. 
 There is no reason to think that the restructuring support agreement 
kept all the sophisticated parties on the sidelines. The remaining parties 
were as sophisticated and as informed as those who had reached a deal 
with the debtor.  
In the modern reorganization world, negotiations done in the shadow 
of the substantive entitlements of §1129 should perhaps be given con-
siderable slack. As long as distressed debt investors are active in the case 
with skin in the game, there is little danger that the bankruptcy judge will 
be left in the dark.   
In deciding whether to approve the assumption of a restructuring 
agreement reached outside of bankruptcy or to bless one reached inside 
of bankruptcy, the bankruptcy judge should assess the integrity of the 
process as much as the terms itself. To return to Bush Industries, the rea-
son to worry about the payout to the CEO was not the fact of the pay-
ment itself, but rather what the payment did to the process. In Bush In-
dustries, the fear was that the controlling shareholders who would be 
wiped out had been bought off. When the person who is supposed to 
lead the negotiations is bought off, the full merits of the secured credi-
tor’s priority position is not fully tested. The other shareholders who 
would otherwise vicariously benefit from the efforts of the controlling 
shareholder are the ones who suffer. The right question to ask is are the 
sort of circumstances that should give rise to these process concerns. 
Seen from this perspective, Bush Industries becomes a harder case. 
Although the agreement between the secured creditors and the CEO left 
him with no incentive to challenge the position of the senior creditors, 
the bankruptcy judge did appoint an equity committee. The committee 
vigorously contested the priority rights of the senior creditor, and the 
bankruptcy judge found that the senior creditors were owed much more 
than the firm was worth. The valuation problem turned in the end of the 
prospects of the ready-to-assemble office furniture market.  
One can argue that the equity committee’s participation in the case 
made up for the CEO’s lack of the appropriate incentive to push for a 
valuation that would leave equity in the money. Of course, one might 
argue in the other direction. The CEO might have a sense of the pro-
spects of landing another large customer that might not be accessible to 
the experts for the equity committee. But in deciding whether the plan 
was filed it “good faith” within the meaning of 1129(a)(3), it would have 
 made sense to focus on this question, rather than abstract intuitions 
about fair play or a multi-factored test. 
Even if they have not articulated any theory of how this bargaining 
should be policed, bankruptcy judges do seem able to find sufficient ob-
jective markers to ensure that the process is one in which parties are not 
keeping information from them. Residential Capital 63 illustrates the toler-
ance postpetition support agreements enjoy, at least if square corners are 
cut. Residential Capital’s plan support agreement was forged after the 
petition was filed, but the support agreement emerged only after many 
months of negotiation, aided in part by court-supervised mediation con-
ducted by another bankruptcy judge. A chief restructuring officer who 
was not beholden to the debtor’s parent represented the debtor, and the 
plan support agreement put the debtor on the path to settling billions of 
disputed claims. The court approved the debtor’s entering the plan sup-
port agreement and also found that each of the parties to the agreement 
acted reasonably and in good faith. 
In cases such as Residential Capital, the active participation of a sitting 
bankruptcy judge as a mediator of the negotiations that led to the nego-
tiations made a difference, as did the fact that the debtor was represent-
ed by a newly appointed chief restructuring officer and was overseen by 
disinterested members of the board. The more these factors are present, 
the heavier the burden on the parties who object to explain how they are 
aggrieved or, more precisely, why any grievances they have are ones that 
they will not be able to voice at plan confirmation.  
Ultimately, the question of how to police the bargaining can be put 
simply. The question is how the bankruptcy judge should assess the 
trade-off between getting the information and keeping the case on track. 
Moreover, the bankruptcy judge does not need that much information 
to figure out what is going on. She is a skeptical recipient of knowledge. 
She can draw inferences from what contesting parties tell her.64  
What the court must do, however, is resist the temptation to unmoor 
the “fair and equitable” principle and similar language from history and 
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 theory. Any general review for “fairness” risks a degenerative process 
that begins with some law clerk inventing a vacuous laundry list of fac-
tors to be considered. Such tests are seductive because they give the illu-
sion of certainty, but such tests are always hopelessly malleable and in-
definite. They invite those who adopt them to replace careful thinking 
with mechanical recitation and hand-waving. The judge should instead 
take direct measure of the agreement and the path that led to it. Any 
support agreement that forces the hand of the judge too much or keeps 
her from understanding the lay of the land should be suspect. 
VI. Conclusion 
The focus of this essay has been in one sense overtly positive. It has 
asked squarely the question of how the bankruptcy judge should react to 
a radical change in bankruptcy practice that takes place almost entirely 
off-stage. Such an approach accepts much as given. The Bankruptcy 
Code’s commitment to a regime organized around a judicial valuation 
may itself be suspect. Moreover, the elaborate confirmation rules them-
selves are not God-given. Judges and lawyers, however, are not charged 
with such normative inquiries about the wisdom of the law. Neverthe-
less, judges must make normative judgments about how to interpret the 
law she is given. 
A judge must be faithful to directives Congress put in place in 1978 
as she attempts to make sense of a practice that was never contemplated 
by Congress and that does not fall within the explicit ambit of any statu-
tory text. By incorporating language from previous opinions such as 
“fair and equitable,” the Bankruptcy Code invites the judge to function 
as a common law judge and extract core principles from foundational 
cases and interpret them in a way that is consistent with and makes 
sense of the overall structure of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Accepting such an approach requires a belief that there is more co-
herence to the Bankruptcy Code than can be gleaned from text standing 
on its own and that experience, often deep in the past, provides a sensi-
ble path. It is not an approach congenial to cynics or free-spirits, but it is 
one that bankruptcy judges and practitioners, or at least the very best 
ones, have embraced for a long time and that has served them well. 
 
